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Chapter 14: The book, the author, the community and expertise. 
My contact with the field began in 1972 at the peak of the controversy over whether Joe Weber 
had detected gravitational waves with his room temperature resonant-bar detectors.  The 
controversy over gravitational waves made up about a quarter of my PhD project in the 
sociology of science.  In those days I conducted my research by going from laboratory to 
laboratory and interviewing the scientists.  I conducted eight interviews in Britain and America 
in 1972 and a further 14 in Europe and America in 1975/6.  The work I did in 1972 gave rise to 
what became a very well-known paper which secured my career.  In 1985 I wrote Changing 
Order, basing it on three of the four sets of interviews I carried out in those years with the 
gravitational wave research being the central case-study.  A much deeper engagement with the 
field began in in the mid-1990s.  Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s I spent more time 
with gravitational wave physicists than with any other group including my fellow sociologists.  In 
those years I travelled to pretty well every conference and workshop the physicists held, often 
completing more than half-a-dozen flights a year, many of them long-haul.  During this period I 
got to know the community really well and made new friends and acquaintances among them.  
Crucially, I got to like them and like their project.  I felt comfortable among these scientists and 
privileged to be close to this extraordinary enterprise.   
Relevant to this book is the analysis of expertise that has been central to my work for more than 
ten years.  The crucial and most successful concept within that stream of work is ‘interactional 
expertise’.1  Interactional expertise is best exemplified by my understanding of gravitational-
wave physics during the period of my intense involvement; in that time, over coffee, lunch and 
dinner I would talk gravitational-wave physics with my new friends and acquaintances and do a 
pretty good job of it even though I was not a physicist myself: I could not do a calculation; I 
could not contribute to papers; I could not help with building the apparatus. Nevertheless, I 
thought that someone like myself, with interactional expertise, but, as the language went, 
without ‘contributory expertise’, could understand the field to the point of being able to make 
reasonable technical judgments.  I pointed out that peer-reviewers and managers of 
technological projects are in a not dissimilar position.  This led me to try it out and I took part in 
an ‘imitation game’ in which a GW physicist asked technical questions – he asked seven in all – 
of me and another GW physicist.  The dialogue – seven questions and seven pairs of answers 
with identities disguised – was then sent to nine other GW physicists who were asked to identify 
the participants, knowing one of them was me.  Seven said they couldn’t work out who was who 
and two said I was the real physicist.  So I passed!2 
Interactional expertise degrades if it is not continually refreshed by constant contact with the 
changing field of science or technology, or other domain, to which it pertains.  Because the 
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intensity of my engagement with GW physics has diminished since the mid-2000s, my expertise 
has also begun to fade.  It was given a couple of boosts as I wrote Gravity’s Ghost and Big Dog 
but I don’t think I ever quite regained the wide level of knowledge I had earlier.   
Since the end of the Big Dog analysis another 3 or 4 years has passed during which time I have 
not been to more than about one meeting a year.  I’ve fallen back further in my understanding 
of the field, particularly the detailed workings of the instruments.   Fortunately the loss of that 
kind of knowledge has not been fatal; if I was trying to write a second edition of Gravity’s 
Shadow it would have been more troublesome.   
Luckily this book is not about building detectors but about the way a detection is confirmed 
once the signals emerge from the completed devices.  That means I need a narrow body of 
understanding which, fortunately, I refined to a pretty high level in writing Big Dog.   
But to leave it like that would be disingenuous.  Therefore I undertook another Imitation Game 
to see if it would reveal the fading of my expertise.  Sathyprakash, Professor of Physics at 
Cardiff, once more helped by inventing a new set of questions more suited to 2015.  He set eight 
questions as follows.   
Q1. Advanced LIGO and Virgo data contain two signals from identical binary neutron star 
systems with their coalescence times separated by just 1 second. Explain if you think it would be 
possible to disentangle the two overlapping signals by matched filtering.  
Q2. Einstein Telescope is a possible future 3rd generation gravitational wave detector. It is 
conceived to be an underground detector using cryogenic technology. What sources of noise are 
being mitigated by going underground and using cryogenics. 
Q3. An alert from LIGO-Virgo analysis is sent to astronomers a day after a transient event was 
found. What sort of telescopes (gamma-ray, x-ray, infrared, optical, radio) should astronomers 
use for follow-up and why? 
Q4. A continuous gravitational wave signal is observed by a single LIGO detector with a high 
confidence. Explain if you think it will be possible to obtain the sky position of and distance to the 
source?  
 Q5. It is said that the pulsar timing arrays (PTAs) and laser interferometers are essentially based 
on the same principle of detection of gravitational waves. What is this principle and how does it 
apply to PTAs and laser interferometers? 
Q6. An experimentalist suggests using 10 times greater laser power to improve the sensitivity of 
an existing interferometer. Assuming that mirrors are able to withstand such an increase in the 
power and neglecting mirror thermal noise how do you think the strain sensitivity of the detector 
improves at different frequencies. 
Q7. LIGO and Virgo take data for 5 years during which there is a galactic supernovae, 200 short, 
hard gamma-ray bursts and 4 pulsar glitches but fail to detect any signals. Under the 
circumstances, what are the implications of non-detection? 
 Q8. Two teams, E and N, came up with detector designs both of which had the same distance 
range for binary coalescences; the E team had better strain sensitivity with a low frequency 
cutoff of 5 Hz while the N team had relatively poorer strain sensitivity but a slightly lower low 
frequency cutoff of 1 Hz. Explain if you think they will both be equally good in measuring the 
parameters of a coalescing binary. 
These questions were answered initially by me and three other gravitational wave physicists.  
This time I decided to make the test more elaborate and asked other kinds of people to answer 
too so as to obtain some comparisons.  The ‘bottom line’ is shown in Table 2 below: 
 
  Who marked the answers? 
  4 different 
GW 
physicists 
2 Savvy 
social 
scientists 
2 Social 
scientists 
Harry 
Collins 
Who 
answered 
the 
questions? 
3 GW physicists 27 27 19 23 
3 Savvy physicists 19 23 17 13 
2 Savvy soc scientists  17 20 19 11 
   Harry Collins 25 27 20 28 
Table 2: Overall outcome of new GW Imitation Game 
As can be seen, four groups answered the eight questions – counting Harry Collins as a group.  
There were 3 GW physicists, there were 3 astronomers/astrophysicists who worked in the same 
department as the GW physicists (referred to as ‘savvy physicists’) and 2 social scientists who 
were acquainted with my work on gravitational waves and with Imitation Game tests of this sort 
(referred to as the ‘savvy social scientists’).  Four groups also marked the questions; there were 
72 questions and answers in a list randomised at the level of the individual question.3  Markers 
have to score the answers according to the following four-point scale giving a maximum of 32 
points: 
Knows GW physics:4    Understands:3    Unconvincing:2   Does not know GW physics:1 
Starting with the left hand column we see that Collins did pretty well when marked by the GW 
physicists – better than I expected – scoring 25 points as opposed to the 27 point mean which 
the three GW physicists achieved.  The effective similarity of these two scores can be seen by 
noting the wide separation between them and the scores achieved by the non-GW specialist 
physicists and the social scientists.  I believe, however, that my achievement in this test 
underestimates the erosion of my expertise over the last few years.   
This erosion is a bit more evident if we go to the last column.  Here I mark all the other answers 
and mark my own as well.  I should add that the marking was done 4 months after I had 
answered the questions and I recognised only two of my own answers.  That I gave myself such 
a high score is, nevertheless, quite understandable since one is bound to think one’s own 
answers are right.  Note also that I mark in a roughly similar way to the GW physicists.  
Recognising what counts as a right answer is nearly as much of an indicator of understanding as 
providing the answer in the first place so the fact that there is wide separation between my 
marks for the GW physicists and those of the physicists and savvy social scientists is a plus for 
me.  The gap between the marks I gave myself and the marks I gave the GW physicists is, 
however, revealing of the erosion of my expertise.  To reiterate, part of this gap is due to the 
fact that one tends to mark one’s own questions well because if one didn’t believe them one 
wouldn’t have given them in the first place.  Comparing the marks I gave myself and the marks 
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the GW physicists gave me, I think I over-marked myself by two or three points.  But I also 
investigated my low marking of the GW physicists very carefully and it does show that in a 
couple of cases I did not understand the physicists’ answers because of the weakening of my 
contact with the field.  In the case of one answer, I just marked carelessly but I can tie this down 
to the erosion of my understanding in the case of two other answers.  If, over the last few years, 
I had been hanging around with the GW physicists as intensely as I did in the 1990s and early 
2000s I would not have made these mistakes and, being, as it turns out, an overall low marker – 
we all have different marking tendencies – I would have given the physicists a rounded average 
mark of 25 instead of 23 plus another point for careless grading of one question.  So that is a 
measure of the erosion of my understanding as measured by this test.   
I investigated the answers to Question 2 the most carefully because I thought I had the answer 
right and the physicists had it wrong.  But it turned out, after a lot of inquiries, that the account 
of gravity gradients that I had in mind, and in my account was the most important reason for 
building underground, was incorrect.  It has been correct a decade earlier when I was more 
deeply embedded in the science but I had missed the change in understanding that had 
happened over those ten years.  The difference is that for me gravity gradients were mostly 
about changes in gravitational forces on the mirrors caused by the changes in air density 
associated with wind and this can be mitigated by going underground to a shallow depth 
whereas as time went on this effect was found to be small and the serious problem has come to 
be seen as changes caused by attractions from miniscule ripples in the earth’s surface associated 
with seismic noise; to mitigate these one needs to go much deeper and going that deep is not 
on many people’s minds as there are other ways of compensating for the effect.  We can see the 
difference in these two quotations from the literature from 2000 and 2011 respectively: 
At such low frequencies environmental effects, and particularly gravity gradients 
associated with tides and weather variations in the surrounding environment, create 
perturbations which greatly exceed the desired signal. (L Ju, D G Blair and C Zhao, 2000, 
‘Detection of gravitational waves’ Rep. Prog. Phys. 63 (2000) 1317–1427, p1326) 
the dominant source of gravity gradients arise from seismic surface waves, where 
density fluctuations of the Earth’s surface are produced near the location of the 
individual interferometer test masses (Matthew Pitkin, Stuart Reid, Sheila Rowan, Jim 
Hough (2011) ‘Gravitational Wave Detection by Interferometry (Ground and Space)’ 
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1102.3355.pdf p13) 
To repeat, I’d missed this change and that is why I thought the physicists were all wrong and I 
was right.  That is a kind of iconic example of what happens as one’s interactional expertise 
begins to degrade and why it is bound to happen if one is not continually mixing with the 
community.   
I found that apart from the gravity gradients problem, I was also not so good on the relationship 
between low-frequency and determination of chirp mass and sky position.  In retrospect, I can 
see that if I had not been following things closely since September I would have been out of date 
on the optimum length of time-slides (Chapter 4) and the status of the idea of a freeze on 
detector states.  But my background knowledge is such that in respect of all of these technical 
matters, I could have caught up with a short conversation. 
Going back to the overall marks, we can see that the non-GW physicists, even when marked by 
GW-physicists, did not do much better than the savvy social scientists and the separation of GW-
physicists plus Collins on the one hand and non-GW-physicists plus social scientists on the other 
is quite clear.  This little tests reveal how specialised science is – there are no ‘science experts in 
white coats’.  It is made more striking by the fact that the savvy physicists were pretty savvy.  
The one who did best wrote to me later: 
For what it's worth I based my answers on what I've learned over the years from seminars 
by GW people, papers that I've read as a member of peer review and policy committees, 
and reading semi-popular (Scientific American level) articles.  But also the questions about 
noise and sensitivity made some sense to me as my own field is experimental 
(electromagnetic) astronomy.  
In spite of this, there score was similar to that of the social scientists when marked by GW 
physicists.  Furthermore, the two mean scores, given that there were 8 questions, were 2.4 and 
2.1 – both hovering only just above ‘unconvincing’ on the grading scale.  So it was not so much 
that the savvy social scientists were good, but that the savvy physicists were not very good! 
Looking at the middle columns we see that the ability to distinguish between the classes 
diminishes as the markers grow less expert – this is exactly what we would expect; looking at 
the third column we see ordinary social scientists mark everyone roughly the same.  This show 
that ‘the public’ are very easy to fool; all ‘experts’ look the same to them. 
Finally, sometime after the main exercise was completed, I asked two physicists from a 
university where gravitational waves was not a central concern to mark the test.  Their 
specialties were theoretical optical physics and particle physics respectively.  If presented as one 
of the columns in Table 2 their average rounded scores would be 22, 18, 18, 18, which, in terms 
of discrimination between the experts and the non-experts, is closer to the non-savvy social 
scientists than any other group.  The two sets of marks, however, were rather different with the 
second mark being close to random so it seems right to report them both.  They were 25, 18, 18, 
19 and 19, 18, 19, 17.  The first set is the only one to make a marked separation between Collins 
and the GW physicists; this is puzzling and it may be that stylistic features were playing a role. 
Going back to the question of my fading expertise, expertise is multi-dimensional and erosion in 
respect of another of the less obviously technical dimensions is much harder to rectify – it 
cannot be rectified by a few minutes of conversation.  In our book, Rethinking Expertise, we pull 
out 16 components of expertise or judgements about expertise and even that isn’t quite right.  
In later papers we explain that the main components of technical understanding, interactional 
and contributory expertise, need further refinement.  A vital component of these kinds of 
expertise is an understanding of the credibility of those who are making expert claims.  This is 
easily seen in the ‘meta-expertise’ rows of what we call ‘The Periodic Table of Expertises’ – the 
rows that cover ability to judge between different experts and enable one to discount certain 
politicians and salespersons, judge between astronomers and astrologers, judge, or 
unfortunately fail to judge, between doctors and vaccine-scare mongers, and, most usefully, 
judge between scientists paid by the tobacco and oil companies to deliver certain results 
favourable to them and those who are driven by scientific values.  But that kind of meta-
judgement also makes up a component of the ‘purely’ technical expertises.   
Our standard and oft-repeated example is, once more, taken from gravitational wave physics.  In 
1996 Joe Weber published a paper claiming to have a found a correlation between gamma-ray 
bursts and the gravitational waves he had found in earlier years.  I went around the community 
asking scientists what they made of this paper.  I discovered that I was the only person to have 
read it.  The ‘technical’ judgment being made was that Weber’s credibility had now fallen so low 
that this, in spite of its perfectly respectable appearance, was a ‘non-paper’.   arXiv, the physics 
preprint server, uses a computer algorithm to screen submissions.  In 2015 we discovered that 
this paper, albeit twenty years old, still passed arXiv’s screening process without problem.  
Indeed, to outsiders the paper has all the appearance of a potential Nobel-prize-winning 
contribution to physics.4   
In a paper published in 2011we call the kind of expertise needed to make the judgment that 
Weber’s 1996 paper should be ignored, ‘Domain-Specific Discrimination’ and define it as, ‘the 
‘‘non-technical’’ expertise used by technical experts to judge their fellow experts’.5  Apart from 
what has been shown by my inadequate marking of the GW question test, I have lost the ability 
to make this kind of judgment in respect to a good proportion of the community as result of my 
years of distance from the field; this is where I feel the loss of expertise most strongly; given 
what I already know, the technical losses can be patched with a few email inquiries or telephone 
discussions but you cannot get to know the competencies and biases of a community like this – 
that takes years.  Over the last few years many new people have entered the field or shifted 
from relative obscurity to positions in which they are making significant contributions.   
Even when I wrote Gravity’s Ghost and Big Dog, both of which depended heavily on my perusal 
of the email traffic, I knew pretty well all the people behind the emails and I knew their political 
stakes in the matter – I could see where people were coming from and assess their 
contributions accordingly.  This time around I do not know what half the contributions mean in 
the sense of domain-specific discrimination – I do not grasp how seriously to take what is being 
said because I do not know the person saying it and why they are saying it.  Thus, I went through 
the 104 emails that I saved rather than deleted in on the first Monday and Tuesday of the 
appearance of G150914 and found there were 45 separate emailers of whom I roughly knew 
only 20.  A few years ago those numbers would have been, perhaps, 40 and 5.  That makes a lot 
of difference to how one understands a field. 
Here is an example from Tuesday 15th when I remark to one of the scientists: 
I found the argument that YYYY because of ZZZZ very weird 
to which came the response  
A very weird argument indeed from XXXX, although perhaps not so weird considering it 
was from XXXX ;-) 
On the other hand, in another conversation on 28th I am told: 
I think before we’re done we’re are going to have to understand whether there is any 
credibility (44.42) to that … and I think that’s going to be a struggle because yyyy is a 
really smart guy and he’s pretty self-confident and he will say he believes it and people 
have enough respect for him that they will not blow him off so I don’t know how we’re 
going to resolve that. [Interview with Peter 28 Sept] 
As it happens I know the person referred to in the second comment well enough to understand 
and appreciate what is being said.  But I don’t the person who is the subject of the first 
comment and in general this is the kind of thing that I am finding much harder to work out for 
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myself in respect of GW50914 than Big Dog – I am, to repeat, losing Domain Specific 
Discrimination (DSD).  It is easy to see how DSD affects face-to-face communication and in 
another place I show how lack of familiarity causes me to make a mistake over the body 
language of someone with whom I am heatedly discussing an issue, but what has become clear 
to me since the event is that the same applies to the interpretation of emails.6  The written word 
is not just written: its meaning rests on a raft of previous social interactions.  This is a very 
important point in these days when communication among the younger generation appears to 
rest more-and-more on social media. 
  
Notes and References 
Notes 
XV  Interactional Expertise: The idea of Interactional Expertise brings language into central 
focus.  It is argued that by spending enough time taking part in the spoken discourse of a 
specialist group – by acquiring their ‘practice language’ (Collins, 2011) – one can learn to 
understand their world of practice without taking part in the practice itself.  This idea flies in the 
face of a long tradition in philosophy which stresses the central importance of practice to 
understanding.   
The origin of the argument is debates in artificial intelligence (AI).  The influential philosopher 
Hubert Dreyfus, drawing on the philosophers Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, argued in a famous 
(1967) paper and subsequent books  (1972, 1992) that computers would never have human-like 
intelligence unless they had bodies with which they could move around and experience the 
world in the ways that humans experience it.  AI enthusiast Doug Lenat argued that this must be 
wrong because of the capacities of persons who did not possess ordinary human-like bodies.  
His example was ‘Madeleine’; Madeleine was severely disabled from birth yet was entirely 
fluent with her fluency attained through conversation not physical interaction (Sacks, 2011).  
The response to this by philosophers (eg Selinger; 2003; Selinger at al, 2007) was that Madeleine 
had a body with front, back, etc and could work from this.  But this answer allows that even if 
we need some kind of vestigial body to have intelligence (the argument seems doubtful but let 
us allow it), we don’t need much of a body to learn everything practical we need to learn; we 
can learn from conversation. 
Collins (eg 1996) tried to resolve the problem by splitting it into two.  Human societies, or 
specialist groups within those societies, would not be human-like unless they had bodies, but 
individuals can learn from those societies without sharing their bodily form.   
Wittgenstein said that if a lion could speak we would not understand it.  The reason we 
would not understand it is that the world of a talking lion - its `form of life' - would be 
different from ours … lions would not have chairs in their language in the way we do 
because lions' knees do not bend as ours do, nor do lions `write, go to conferences or 
give lectures'.  ... But this does not mean that every entity that can recognise a chair has 
to be able to sit on one.  That confuses the capabilities of an individual with the form of 
life of the social group in which that individual is embedded.  Entities that can recognise 
chairs have only to share the form of life of those who can sit down.  We would not 
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understand what a talking lion said to us, not because it had a lion-like body, but 
because the large majority of its friends and acquaintances had lion-like bodies and lion-
like interests.  In principle, if one could find a lion cub that had the potential to have 
conversations, one could bring it up in human society to speak about chairs as we do in 
spite of its funny legs.  It would learn to recognise chairs as it learned to speak our 
language.  This is how the Madeleine case is to be understood; Madeleine has 
undergone linguistic socialization. In sum, the shape of the bodies of the members of a 
social collectivity and the situations in which they find themselves give rise to their form 
of life.  Collectivities whose members have different bodies and encounter different 
situations develop different forms of life.  But given the capacity for linguistic 
socialisation, an individual can come to share a form of life without having a body or the 
experience of physical situations which correspond to that form of life.7   
To put this in terms of more familiar examples, one cannot have a tennis language to learn from 
unless there are groups of humans with the physical ability to play tennis but one can learn what 
it is to play tennis and, in principle, all its practical nuances, just by talking to tennis players.  The 
same, of course, goes for gravitational wave physics.   
It is not easy to acquire interactional expertise – it takes a long time – but once acquired it is 
much more than the ability to ‘talk the talk’.  It is better described as being able to ‘walk the 
talk’.  It has much in common with the kinds of knowledge managers of technical projects 
possess (Collins and Sanders, 2007).  The idea of interactional expertise seems necessary if we 
are to understand many features of the way societies work, how they support the division of 
labour in technical specialties and the way sub-groups interact with society as a whole.  A useful 
discussion of the concept in the context of a classification of different types of expertise is 
Collins and Evans, 2007, while the most recent and complete review is Collins and Evans 2015. 
As explained in the text, it is the idea of interactional expertise that makes it possible to 
contemplate an outsider without a physics degree undertaking a project like this one.  It is also 
the idea of interactional expertise that gives impetus to Imitation Game exercises such as that 
discussed in Chapter 14 and Note XVI. 
XVI  Imitation Games and Turing Tests: As mentioned in Note XV, Imitation Games are 
associated with interactional expertise.  Imitation Games were the precursor to the Turing Test.  
Turing based his test on a parlour game in which hidden men and women pretended to be each 
other while responding to written questions from a judge.  Turing believed that a computer 
should be called ‘intelligent’ if, say, it was as good at pretending to be a woman as was a man 
pretending to be a woman; to reiterate, what was supposed to be indistinguishable according to 
the original description of the test (Turing 1950) was a computer pretending to be a woman 
versus a man pretending to be a woman (or vice versa), not a computer pretending to be a 
human compared to a human – the way so-called Turing Tests are conducted these days.   
We use Imitation Games, that is, Turing Tests with humans, to test for the possession of 
interactional expertise.  A classic example is an experiment in which blind persons pretending to 
be sighted are compared to sighted persons with sighted persons asking the question.  The 
questioning can be mediated via interlinked computers.  This configuration is compared to one 
where sighted persons pretend to be blind while being compared to blind persons with blind 
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persons asking the questions.  In these pairs of tests, the blind persons pretending to be sighted 
do much better that the reverse because blind persons are immersed in the spoken discourse of 
the sighted whereas the sighted are not, generally, immersed in the discourse of the blind.  Thus 
blind persons have many opportunities to acquire interactional expertise in the world of the 
sighted.  We have run such tests at various scales and on various topics (Collins and Evans, 
2014).   
The original gravitational wave imitation game test was run over email with a gravitational wave 
physicist setting seven questions which were answered by Collins along with another 
gravitational wave physicist.  The completed dialogues were sent to nine other gravitational 
wave physicists who were asked: ‘Which is the real gravitational wave physicist and which is 
Harry Collins?’  Seven of these said they could not tell the difference and two said Collins was 
the real gravitational wave physicist.  An account was written up as a news item in Nature (Giles, 
2006).  It is important to understand, however, that contrary to what the Nature story can be 
read to imply, this exercise was not a hoax but a demonstration of genuine understanding as 
exhibited by a display of interactional expertise.  A more elaborated version of this test applied 
to Collins’s slightly eroded level of interactional expertise is described in Chapter 14.  
Interactional expertise is, of course, closely related to the concept of tacit knowledge – see 
Notes VIII and XV.  Collins, 2010, is an analysis of tacit knowledge.   
XVII  Domain discrimination, specialist expertise, and the fringes of science:  As explained 
(p237xxx), the sociologist must studiously avoid short-circuiting the process of inquiry into the 
social factors that feed into scientific belief.  This implies that truth, or rationality, or similar 
cannot be allowed to be part of the explanation of why something came to be believed.  It thus 
becomes very difficult for the sociologist to distinguish between mainstream science and what 
we can call ‘fringe science’.  There is a large, organised, fringe with its own journals and its own 
annual conferences (Collins, Bartlett and Galindo, 2016 arXiv XXXX).  One concern of many fringe 
scientists is a rejection of the theory of relativity; some claim the theory is a massive conspiracy, 
even, given Einstein’s support for Israel, a Jewish conspiracy!  Whatever, rejection of relativity 
implies rejection of The Event.  Chapter 11 gives some examples of such rejections.   
The self-denying ordinance of the sociologist makes the partition of science into mainstream 
and fringe a much more interesting problem that it is when analysts simply allow themselves the 
luxury of being parasites on the opinions of the scientists themselves – ‘scientists say relativity is 
right so people who do not believe in it are irrational’.  Instead one must try to find sociological 
demarcation criteria, a much more demanding task.  It is an important task, not so much for the 
future of scientific knowledge where what counts as the truth will emerge over the decades, but 
for the decisions that have to be made by policy-makers.  For example, in 1992 (Gravity’s 
Shadow p 361) Joe Weber wrote to his Congressional representatives indicating that his new 
theory of the sensitivity of resonant bars meant that the much more expensive interferometers 
were a waste of money.  This presented no problem to the mainstream community but how was 
an outside decision-maker to judge the claim?  The only answer seems to be that that in a 
democracy decision-makers will have to base their decisions on the opinions of the mainstream 
institutions and that is why demarcation criteria, that are more than the opinions of scientists, 
are needed.  Strangely enough arXiv has a similar problem in that it receives many submissions 
from fringe papers and the sheer logistics of the operation demands some automation.  In 
collaboration with Paul Ginsparg, the founder of arXiv, (Collins, Galindo and Ginsparg, 2016) we 
have shown that the automated methods used by arXiv, though they represent the state of the 
art, do not recognise papers, such as Weber and Radak, 1996, as anything out of the ordinary.  
What is needed in those cases is what we call ‘Domain Specific Discrimination’ or ‘Domain 
Discrimination’ for short (Collins and Weinel, 2011, p407).    
In Collins, Bartlett and Galindo 2016, we establish a series of characterisations of the fringe.  
Indicative is the difference between the fringe and the mainstream in respect of what Thomas 
Kuhn (1959, 1977) called ‘the essential tension’.  The essential tension is that between the need 
to preserve the right of the individual to make novel claims setting him or herself outside of the 
consensus and the need to accept a degree of regulation of scientific thinking and acting if 
science is to move forward.  In the normal way, science is always balancing these two needs.  
We find that in the fringe the balance shifts markedly to the side of the individual with 
consensus being thought dull or suspiciously authoritarian; this shift in the balance is even 
visible in fringe scientific conferences with each delegate’s pet theory being given space to be 
expressed resulting in a general lack of organisation.  In this book, of course (Chapter 11), given 
the uniform lack of criticism among the mainstream, we find ourselves drawing on the fringe to 
provide criticism of the first detection of gravitational waves; it is the fringe, in refusing to 
accept the social consensus, that allows us to see the extent to which acceptance of The Event is 
a matter of social consensus! 
Four previous books touching on gravitational waves 
Collins, Harry (1985) Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, 
Beverley Hills & London: Sage. [2nd edition 1992, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press] 
Collins, Harry (2004) Gravity's Shadow: The Search for Gravitational Waves, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
Collins, Harry (2011), Gravity’s Ghost: Scientific Discovery in the Twenty-First Century, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Collins, Harry (2013), Gravity’s Ghost and Big Dog: Scientific Discovery and Social 
Analysis in the Twenty-First Century, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press [includes a reprint of Gravity’s Ghost]  
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